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et al.: Torts—Minnesota Replaces the Restatement Standard with a Negligen

CASE NOTE

Torts-MINNESOTA

REPLACES THE RESTATEMENT

NEGLIGENCE STANDARD IN DESIGN DEFECT

STANDARD

WITH A

CASEs-Bilotta v. Kelly Co.,

346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
With the advent of strict tort liability' and section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2 the focus in products liability cases has
shifted from the manufacturer's conduct to the product.3 This
1. Strict liability in tort for defective products was first formally recognized in
the landmark decision of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 694 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER & KEETON]. Minnesota first formally recognized strict tort liability
in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
2. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to the liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer had not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

3. Before the promulgation of § 402A, the three theories of recovery-negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability in tort-presented major obstacles which an injured plaintiff had to overcome in order to recover. Although the
privity of contract requirement was eliminated in negligence and breach of warranty
cases, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)
(breach of warranty), serious problems remained with those theories. The defendant
in a negligence action could escape liability by establishing due care. See McCormack,
278 Minn. at 333-34, 154 N.W.2d at 497. The plaintiff in a warranty action was often
fettered with notice requirements and disclaimers. Id. at 338-39, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
The landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), dissolved these problems by creating an independent theory of strict products liability in tort. Id. at 62, 337 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
The Greenman court, in seeking to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving negligence, reasoned that manufacturers should pay for the injuries which result from the
use of their products if the product was in fact defective. Id. With the Greenman decision, the focus of a products liability action shifted to the condition of the product
rather than the conduct of the manufacturer. Nevertheless, the Greenman reformula-
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evolution has necessitated the development of a standard to determine whether a product was defective.4 Unlike manufacturing defect
cases, where an individual product is unintentionally and dangerously flawed,5 design defect cases involve goods that are produced as
the manufacturer intended.6 This distinction has created a great
deal of controversy concerning the definition of a defective product.7
Courts have failed to agree on the appropriate standard for determining product defectiveness in design defect cases. 8 An analysis of
tion was not flawless. The term "defect" was never defined. In 1965, § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts was promulgated. Section 402A added a definition of
defective and codified MacPherson, Henningsen, and Greenman. Under § 402A, a product is defective it if is unreasonably dangerous. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment g. A product is unreasonably dangerous if it is "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id comment i. Jurisdiction after jurisdiction immediately began to recognize § 402A and it became the dominant theory in products liability actions. See
Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS
LJ. 529, 534 n.29 (1983).
4. Cf Diamond, supra note 3, at 530.
5. A manufacturing defect is an unintended abnormality or condition in a product that makes the product more dangerous than an unblemished product. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 99, at 695. See generally Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973).
6.

"[A] product contains a 'design defect' if the imperfection was introduced on

the drafting board and the product comes out exactly as the manufacturer had intended." J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 69 (1981).
7. "At present, the question of design defect and the determination of when a
product is actionable because of the nature of its design appears to be the most agitated and controversial question before the courts in the field of products liability."

Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.REV. 551, 576
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Design Defects].

8. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978) (consumer expectation standard used as threshhold test for manufacturer's duty; alternatively, manufacturer must prove that benefits outweigh risks of
design once plaintiff proves that manufacturer's product proximately caused plaintiffs injury); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972) (unreasonably dangerous requirement of § 402A rejected; recovery
requires proof of defect in design or manufacture of the product and that defect
proximately caused plaintiffs injuries); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich.
App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978), afd, 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982) (plaintiff must prove either that design was not in conformity with industry design standards or that the design embraces a latent risk of injury and the manufacturer failed
to warn against that risk); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (1979) (product is defective if it is not reasonably fit, suitable, and safe for
its intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose; if design defect is not self-evident,
manufacturers must show that they acted in a reasonably prudent manner in designing and distributing product); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d
1322 (1978) (test for strict liability in tort is whether reasonably prudent manufactur-

ers would have so designed and sold the article had they known of the risks involved);
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (if the court deter-
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recent court decisions,9 scholarly articles,10 and legislation,l howmines that strict liability is applicable, jury may find a defect where the product left
the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended
use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for its intended use); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (product contains a design defect if it is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility
of the product and the risk involved in its use); Fischer v. Cleveland Punch & Shear
Works Co., 91 Wis. 2d 85, 280 N.W.2d 280 (1979) (recovery allowed in design defect
case if the product is designed with a lack of ordinary care and that lack of care resulted in injury; finding of § 402A unreasonable danger not required).
9. See, e.g., Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932 (1976); Bowman v. General
Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass.
633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978); Suter, 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140; Turner, 584 S.W.2d
844.
10. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 649 (1980); Henderson, Renewed
Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773, 774-75 (1979); Hoenig, Product Design and Strict Tort
Liability: Is There a BetterApproach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109, 123-25 (1976); O'Donnell &
Thomas, Design Litigation and Strict Liability Part II: Do the Risks Outweigh the Benefits?, 5
J. PROD. LIAB. 269, 270 (1982); Design Defects, supra note 7, at 568; Note, Elimination of
Strict Liability in Design Defect and Failure to Warn Cases, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 565, 565-66
(1983).
11. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP'. OF COMMERCE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL AT];
see also Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV.
579, 585-86 (1980); infra note 110.
The Model Uniform Products Liability Act is presently pending before Congress
as Senate Bill 100. See S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 131 CONG. REC. S218-23
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). This bill, introduced by Senator Kasten, is substantially the
same bill reported by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in
the 98th Congress. 131 CONG. REC. S217 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1985) (statement by Sen.
Kasten). Section 5 of Senate Bill 100 adopts a pure negligence standard for design
defects:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if, at the
relevant point in time(A) the manufacturer knew or, through the exercise of reasonable prudence, should have known about the danger which allegedly caused the
claimant's harm; and
(B) a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances
would not have manufactured the product or used the design or formulation
that the manufacturer used.
S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b)(1), 131 CONG. REC. S219 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1985).
Once the claimant makes a prima facie case of negligence, the burden of proof shifts
to the manufacturer:
A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if
the manufacturer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the relevant point in time(A) a means to eliminate the danger that caused the harm was not
within practical technological feasibility, and the benefits and usefulness of
the product to the public outweighed the likelihood and probable seriousness of the harm .

...

Id. § 5(b)(2), 131 CONG. REC. S219 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1985); cf
note 110 (partial text of original Model Act).
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ever, reveals an analytical shift from defective product theories to
manufacturer's conduct theories in design defect cases. 12 Consistent
with this trend, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bilotta v. Kelly Co. '3
unanimously replaced the Restatement's product-oriented consumer
expectation standard14 with a conduct-oriented negligence
standard. 15
After the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 402A in
1967,16 it became the dominant strict liability formula applied by the
court.17 Section 402A provides:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user

. . .

is subject to liability for physical harm

. [although] the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of [its] product, and . . . the user
thereby caused.

.

. . . has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-

8
tual relation with the seller.'
The term "defective," as used in section 402A, is a term of art. A
product can be defective by its manufacture, 19 design,20 or by reason

12. For purposes of this Case Note, defective product theories refer to those theories concerned with consumer expectations. Manufacturer's conduct theories refer
to either strict liability or negligence theories which embrace either a factor approach
or a reasonable care risk/utility standard.
13. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
14. For a definition of the consumer expectation standard, see text accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
15. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
16. See McCormack, 278 Minn. at 339-40, 154 N.W.2d at 501 (adopting strict
liability).
17. See, e.g., Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240
N.W.2d 303 (1976), overuled on other grounds, Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d
207 (Minn. 1982); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188
N.W.2d 426 (1971); Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587
(1969). A second strict liability formula reads, "[A] product is defective if it fails to
perform reasonably, adequately and safely the normal, anticipated or specified use to
which the manufacturer intends that it be put." Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288
Minn. 83, 89, 179 N.W.2d 64, 68 (1970). The Farrstandard was followed in Hudson
v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 1982).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; see supra note 2 (complete text of

§ 402A); Lee, 290 Minn. at 328, 188 N.W.2d at 432.
19. Manufacturing defects occur when a manufacturer's construction, inspection,
or assembly procedures produce a product different from what the general design
intended. See Hoenig, supra note 10, at 118. The Restatement consumer expectation
standard is easily applied in manufacturing defect cases because it focuses on the
product and disregards the manufacturer's conduct. The manufacturer's flawless
product is the gauge used to determine whether the product is defective. See Bilotta,
346 N.W.2d at 622; Hoenig, supra note 10, at 118. For Minnesota law on manufacturing defects, see Waite v. American Creosote Works, 295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d
410 (1973); Lee, 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426; Farr,288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64;
Kerr, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587.
20. There are two ways a product can become defectively designed: through an
inadvertent design error, or through a conscious design choice. An inadvertent de-
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of inadequate warnings.21 The Restatement standard, designed prisign error occurs when the design engineer inadvertently fails "to appreciate adequately the implications of the various elements of his design, or to employ
commonly understood and universally accepted engineering techniques to achieve
the ends intended with regard to the product." Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531,
1548 (1973). A conscious design defect occurs when the manufacturer's conscious
decision to choose one design over another, after considering the risks involved with
the product and deciding that the utility or reduced costs justify acceptance of the
risks, turns out to be socially unacceptable or unreasonable. See id. at 1549.
Cases involving inadvertent design errors are not significantly different analytically from manufacturing defect cases. In both, if the design error or manufacturing
defect had been discovered, the manufacturer would not have marketed the product.
See id. at 1548. In addition, inadvertent design errors, like manufacturing defects, are
usually hidden from the user or consumer. See id. at 1549. There is one major difference between these two types of cases. In a design error case, the whole product line
is defective whereas in a manufacturing defect case, only one product is defective.
The standards used to make the determination of the defectiveness, therefore, must
be different.
In manufacturing defect cases, an objective standard exists-the flawless product. In the inadvertent design error case, the standard used cannot be objective because a flawless product does not exist. The standard most often used in the
inadvertent design error case is one set and universally accepted by the engineering
profession for the product line in question. See id. at 1550.
Conscious design defect cases are the most complex and controversial because
there are no standards with which to compare the product. Courts are forced to
second guess a manufacturer's informed decision to consciously choose a particular
design. The peculiar difficulty encountered in conscious design defect cases is the
fact that the design engineers intentionally declined to design the allegedly defective
product to protect against hazards foreseeably encountered. For example, in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974), the design engineers designed a microbus to maximize cargo and passenger space, sacrificing some
of the crash-worthiness of the bus. The plaintiff, who was injured when riding in the
defendant's microbus when it hit a telephone pole, alleged that her injuries were
increased because of this design. The court held the manufacturer not liable, reasoning that the manufacturer was not under a duty to design a bus which would protect
against every conceivable risk of injury. See id. at 1070.
Some courts and commentators contend that the adjudication process as a whole
is unsuited to the task of evaluating a manufacturer's conscious design choice. See,
e.g., Owens, 83 Mich. App. at 80, 268 N.W.2d at 294; Epstein, Product Liability: The
Searchfor the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643, 649-52 (1978); Henderson, supra note
20, at 1531-34, 1539; Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy"
Automobiles: The Need for JudicialResponsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 51-57 (1974). But see
Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 245-56 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("Our
faith in the jury system is considerable").
Minnesota does not presently acknowledge a distinction between an inadvertent
design error and a manufacturer's conscious design choice. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d
616; Holm, 324 N.W.2d 207; Halvorson, 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303; McCormack,
278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488.
21. Failure to warn cases address the issue whether the manufacturer provided
adequate warnings or instructions "in order to prevent the product from becoming
unreasonably dangerous." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A commentj.
In Minnesota, a plaintiff may proceed on either a theory of strict liability or negli-
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marily for use in manufacturing defect cases,2 2 fails to draw a distinction between these three types of defects.23 Due to this omission,
courts began to use the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" as a standard for determining whether a product was defective due to the nature of its design.2 4
The comments to section 402A define "unreasonably dangerous"
as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."25
This definition of unreasonably dangerous is known as the consumer
expectation standard.26 Many jurisdictions were not satisfied with
the consumer expectation standard as a definition of unreasonably
dangerous for use in design defect cases.2 7 Some questioned
gence to establish that the product was defective due to inadequate warning. See
Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1984); Leskey v. Heath Eng'g
Co., 293 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1980); Bigham v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892
(Minn. 1978).
22. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
830-32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Strict Tort Liability].
23. See Cepeda, 76 NJ. at 170, 386 A.2d at 824.
24. See Diamond, supra note 3, at 536.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i.

26. Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota: The Theories of Recoveiy,
6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 30 (1980).

27. See, e.g., Bowman, 427 F. Supp. 234 (risk-utility balancing test appropriate in
determining whether product was unreasonably dangerous); Cepeda, 76 NJ. 152, 386
A.2d 816 (risk-utility analysis used in determining whether defendants' conduct was
that of a reasonably prudent manufacturer); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or.
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (question whether product design is unreasonably dangerous determined by taking into account circumstances and knowledge at time
product was sold and determining therefrom whether reasonably prudent manufacturer would have sold product if he had known risk involved); Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (consideration of utility of product and
risk involved in its use appropriate for jury when determining whether unreasonably
dangerous). But see Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978)
(unreasonably dangerous defect determined by considering what an ordinary consumer with ordinary knowledge common to the community as to a product's characteristics would consider to be unreasonably dangerous); Estate of Ryder v. KelleySpringfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978) (test for defect is
whether the product is dangerous beyond that which would be contemplated by an
ordinary consumer); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69
Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer applied in determining whether product defective).
There are three main reasons why the consumer expectation standard is inadequate and has been rejected in design defect cases: (1) recovery would always be
denied in the case of an obvious defect even though the product could have been
designed safer without great expense; (2) products may be identified as being defective even though they clearly are not; and (3) the precise definition of the "ordinary
consumer" is ambiguous. The consumer expectation standard is therefore difficult
for ajury to understand and apply. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 99, at 69899.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss3/8

6

et al.: Torts—Minnesota Replaces the Restatement Standard with a Negligen
1985]

CASE NOTE

whether the phrase had any independent significance.28 When
courts determined that it did, questions arose regarding how the
phrase should be defined29 and whether the court should make the
initial determination of unreasonable danger before submitting the
28. See, e.g., Bowman, 427 F. Supp. at 242 (no independent meaning); Cronin, 8
Cal. 3d at 133-35, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43 (independent significance); Suter, 81 NJ. at 168-70, 406 A.2d at 152-53 (no independent significance);
Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025 (no independent significance).
29. Aside from the consumer expectation standard, see supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text, the courts have defined unreasonably dangerous in terms of the
reasonably prudent manufacturer, or in terms of a risk/utility balancing test involving
either a list of factors or some form of cost benefit analysis. See Wade, On the Effect in
Product Liability of Knowledge UnavailablePriorto Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 74145 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Product Liability].
Under the reasonably prudent manufacturer test, knowledge of the defect is imputed to the manufacturer. "[A]ssume that the manufacturer knew of the product's
propensity to injure as it did, and then. . . ask whether, with such knowledge, something should have been done about the danger before it was sold." Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974). This test was originally
developed by Dean Wade in an effort to clarify the difference between strict tort
liability and negligence in manufacturing defect cases. See Product Liability, supra, at
761-64; see also Strict Tort Liability, supra note 22, at 834-35. But see Birnbaum, supra
note 10, at 648 (scienter "is an unnecessary fiction that does not theoretically or even
pragmatically serve the questionable foundation upon which it is based").
As applied to design defect cases, this test has been interpreted as imputing the
knowledge available at the time of trial rather than the knowledge available at the
time the product was manufactured. According to Dean Wade, this interpretation is
erroneous and he has since repudiated the reasonably prudent manufacturer test. See
Product Liability, supra, at 764. But see Keeton, supra note 5, at 37-38 ("product. . . is
unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude
of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trialoutweighed
the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed"). Many jurisdictions have followed the reasonably prudent manufacturer test in one form or another. See, e.g., Cepeda, 76 NJ. 152, 386 A.2d 816; Wilson, 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322;
Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033.
The risk/utility balancing test directs either the court or the jury to balance the
degree and likelihood of the harm caused to the plaintiff against the burden or cost of
preventing the harm. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 99, at 699. If the burden of
precaution weighs less than the degree and likelihood of the harm, the manufacturer
has acted unreasonably and has designed an unreasonably dangerous product. Most
courts and commentators acknowledge that this standard is rooted in negligence.
See, e.g., Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1071; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
LJ. 5, 15-16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Liability of Manufacturers].
Professor Wade suggested a list of factors relevant under the risk/utility test to
determine whether the product is unreasonably dangerous:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
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case to the jury. 30 As a result of these exercises in semantics, a myriad of product defectiveness standards developed.3t
Section 402A was not adopted to the exclusion of other product
liability theories in Minnesota.32 Three remedies are available: negligence;33 breach of warranty; 34 and section 402A strict liability.35 In
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Strict Tort Liability, supra note 22, at 837-38 (footnote omitted). Professor Wade does
not recommend that this list of factors be read to the jury because it would only serve
to confuse them. Id. at 840. Rather, the judge is to use the factors to make the initial
determination of whether the product is unreasonably dangerous before the case is
submitted to the jury. Id. In this respect, application of these factors closely resembles a traditional strict liability analysis, in which the judge makes the initial determination as to whether the activity engaged in by the defendant was abnormally
dangerous. See id. at 838; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment 1
(Tent. Draft No. 10 1964).
Since the risk/utility test is so similar to a negligence analysis, many courts differentiate the two theories on the ground that in strict liability the focus is on the product, whereas in negligence the focus is on the conduct of the manufacturer. See, e.g.,
Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432-34, 573 P.2d at 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39; Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 200, 447 A.2d 539, 544 (1982). The majority of the courts appear to have adopted the risk/utility test in one form or another
as a definition of the § 402A unreasonably dangerous standard for use in design defect cases. See, e.g., Bowman, 427 F. Supp. at 245; Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo.
162, 169, 583 P.2d 276, 282-83 (1978); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d
830, 835 (Iowa 1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 809-10, 395
A.2d 843, 847-48 (1978); Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 176, 246
S.E.2d 176, 178 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.
1979).
For an excellent discussion of the different standards used in design defect cases,
see Davison, The Uncertain Search for a Design Defect Standard, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 643
(1981).
30. See, e.g., Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 557-58, 391 A.2d at 1025-26 (determination of
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a question of law decided according
to social policy).
31. See supra note 8 (cases applying various standards).
32. At least one jurisdiction has adopted § 402A to the exclusion of all other
products liability theories. See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353,
1362-63 (Okla. 1974).
33. See Clark v. Rental Equip. Co., 300 Minn. 420, 220 N.W.2d 507 (1974)
(rented scaffolding); McCormack, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (vaporizer); Rosin
v. International Harvester Co., 262 Minn. 445, 115 N.W.2d 50 (1962) (pickup truck);
Peterson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 207 Minn. 387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940)
(stove).
34. See Farr, 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (breach of warranty for defectively
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jurisdictions like Minnesota which recognize three theories of recovery, design defect cases became difficult to reconcile when the jury
arrived at a verdict holding a manufacturer negligent but not strictly
liable.36 This problem, known as the irreconcilable or perverse jury
verdict,3 7 is attributable to the inherent similarities between negligence and strict liability in design defect cases.3 8
Aside from the problem of irreconcilable jury verdicts, section
402A has spawned another distinct problem in design defect casesarbitrary decisionmaking.39 If the consumer expectation standard is
used as a definition of unreasonably dangerous, either party may suffer unfairly. If the plaintiff is aware of the risks involved with the
product either through warnings or because the defect was obvious,
recovery will be denied since the defect was within the contemplation
of the ordinary consumer. 4 0 On the other hand, if the defect was not
within the contemplation of the ordinary consumer, the plaintiff will
recover even though the manufacturer considered many different design alternatives and consciously chose the best one in light of the
risks and utility of the product. In such a case, the informed decisionmaking defense of responsible manufacturers is disregarded because of the consumer expectation standard.41
manufactured tire); Pietrus v. J.R. Watkins Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38 N.W.2d 799
(1949) (breach of implied warranty of fitness for purpose of hair shampoo); MINN.
STAT. § 336.2-715, subd. 2(b) (1984) (consequential damages from seller's breach of
warranty include injury to person or property proximately caused by breach).
35. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Hansen v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 578 F.2d 679, 683-85 (7th Cir. 1978);
Greiten v. La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
37. In Halvorson, 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303, the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that a jury verdict finding the defendant manufacturer not strictly liable
under the § 402A standard, but 25% negligent in the design of its crane, was inconsistent and irreconcilable. Id. at 56, 240 N.W.2d at 307. The court noted that a
finding of negligence is tantamount to a finding that the product is unreasonably
dangerous. If a product is found unreasonably dangerous, this implies that the manufacturer must also be held strictly liable. Id. at 56-57, 240 N.W.2d at 308. For an indepth discussion of Halvorson, see Comment, Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to
Recovery: Minnesota Apparently Adopts the Latent-Patent Doctrine, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
241 (1977). Halvorson has been overruled with respect to the latent-patent doctrine.
Holm, 324 N.W.2d 207.
38. Whether a strict liability analysis overlaps a negligence analysis depends on
the construction given to the § 402A phrase "unreasonably dangerous." If the
phrase is interpreted as connoting a risk/utility balancing test, then the two theories
are, in effect, identical. For a discussion of the risk/utility test and other interpretations of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous," see supra note 29.
39. The consumer expectation test is ambiguous and difficult to apply. "The test
can be utilized to explain most any result that a court or jury chooses to reach. The
application of such a vague concept in many situations does not provide much guidance for a jury." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 99, at 699.
40. See id. § 99, at 698.
41. See id. § 99, at 698-99.
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In Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,42 the Minnesota Supreme Court eliminated
these dilemmas by holding that design defect cases should be submitted to the jury on a single theory of products liability4 3-negligence. 4 4 The allegedly defective product in Bilotta was a mechanical
dockboard45 manufactured by the Kelley Company.4 6 A dockboard
bridges the gap between a loading dock and a semitrailer. A major
hazard at loading docks arises when a truck carrier bed separates
from the dockboard, causing the dockboard and everything on it to
fall. A separation can occur either if the truck pulls or rolls away
from the dockboard or if a forklift truck, upon leaving the truck carrier bed, pushes the truck away from the dockboard.4 7 Defendant
Kelley Company manufactured mechanical dockboards which at48
tempted to cure these hazards. A device known as the panic stop
prevented the first separation hazard.49 In addition, all of Kelley
0
Company's mechanical dockboards incorporated cross-traffic legs.5
This feature cured the second separation hazard.51 Only one Kelley
dockboard model contained both a panic stop and cross-traffic
42. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
43. Id. at 623. The Bilotta court also mentioned in dicta that failure to warn cases
should likewise be submitted on a single theory of products liability. Id. This approach was followed in Hauenstein, 347 N.W.2d 272. In Hauenstein, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had to elect to proceed on a strict liability or a
negligence theory on the failure to warn issue before resting their case. See id. at 275.
Although the failure to warn issue raises considerations similar to design defect
cases, this Case Note is limited to a discussion of Minnesota design defect law.
44. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
45. Only 10% of the dockboards on the market are mechanical. The rest are
portable steel plates. 346 N.W.2d at 619.
46. In the late 1940's Gary Kelley, founder of Kelley Company, designed and
manufactured the industry's first permanently installed adjustable mechanical
dockboard. The Kelley Company soon became the leader in dockboard safety innovation. See Appellant's Brief at 7, Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d 616.
47. 346 N.W.2d at 619.
48. The panic stop is a notched post which is located between the cross-traffic
legs. It is a speed-actuated device. If the dockboard falls fast enough, the panic stop
activates, stopping further descent of the dockboard. See id. at 620.
49. Kelley's competitors addressed this hazard by using a fixed leg system. The
fixed leg system, however, exacerbated the second separation hazard by preventing
the dockboard from floating up and down with a high or low truck carrier bed. As a
result, the height difference between the truck and the loading dock would be absorbed only over the 16-inch lip rather than the entire 8-foot length of the
dockboard. This situation could create a very steep angle for a fork lift truck to negotiate and would eventually cause the fork lift to push the truck away from the
dockboard. See id. at 619.
50. Cross-traffic legs are a patented device invented by the Kelley Company.
They are the front legs on the Kelley dockboard which provide support when the
dockboard is not in use, and fold out of the way when the dockboard is in use. With
the legs folded away, the Kelley dockboard can accomodate truck carrier beds above
or below loading dock level. See Appellant's Brief at 9.
51. 346 N.W.2d at 619.
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It was the safest-and

most expensive-mechanical

53
dockboard on the market.
The dockboard model which led to Albert Bilotta's injuries did not

contain a panic stop.5 4 Kelley Company had made a conscious de-

sign choice to manufacture a mechanical dockboard which did not
incorporate all possible safety features, in order to increase the utility of the product and maintain a competitive price.55 In making a
conscious design choice, Kelley Company's design engineers were
aware of the risks associated with their design, but determined that
the risks were outweighed by the increased benefits and reduced
costs. 5 6

On December 5, 1977, Bilotta was sent to Safelite Warehouse by
Labor Pool Inc., a temporary placement agency.57 He was assigned
general clean-up chores near the loading dock. A forklift which was
unloading a semitrailer became stuck with its right wheels on the
52. Appellant's Brief at 11. The model which injured Bilotta addressed only the
second separation hazard but could be modified to address both hazards. Id.

53. The model with the panic stop and cross-traffic legs cost 40% more than any
other mechanical dockboard on the market. See Appellant's Brief at 11; see also supra
note 49 (discussing dangerous propensities of other designs).
54. The Kelley dockboard in use at the time Bilotta was injured is known as a
contractor's board because it was designed to be easily installed by a building contractor. It is self-forming, meaning it formed its own pit in the concrete loading
dock, thus eliminating the necessity for a carpenter to form the pit. See Appellant's
Brief at 15. Rauenhorst Corporation, the contractor who built the warehouse and
installed the Kelley loading dock, originally specified the larger model with the panic
stop, but then decided to save money and time and installed the smaller Kelley
dockboard without the panic stop. See 346 N.W.2d at 620. The installed model could
be modified to attach a panic stop. This modification would increase the cost of the
installed model to the cost of the panic stop model, and the utility and ease of installation would be lost. See Appellant's Brief at 15.
Kelley Company decided to market the model with cross-traffic legs rather than a
fixed leg system, which addressed the first separation hazard, because their research
indicated that the second separation hazard was more common. See id. at 12-13.
55. See 346 N.W.2d at 619-20. Conscious design choice is a subcategory of design defect law which is directly related to the function of the product. Walkowiak,
Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: "Reasonableness" Revisited?, 44
J. AIR L. & COM. 705, 721 (1979).
56. See 346 N.W.2d at 619-20. This determination encompasses the cost/benefit
test used in design defect law. The law of negligence recognizes that economic factors may be involved in determining what a prudent person may do. Courts consider
factors such as: the probability of risk, the gravity of the resulting injury, and the
economic burden of adequate precautions. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947). A manufacturer has no duty to make a product
accident-proof. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
A manufacturer may, therefore, weigh the risks of injury against increased benefits or
reduced costs in choosing a design. Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 721.
57. 346 N.W.2d at 620. Kelley Company commenced a third-party action against
both Safelite Industries, the lessee of the warehouse, and Labor Pool, Inc. Bilotta
settled with both before trial. Id. at 619 n.1.
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dock and its left wheels on the Kelley dockboard.58 In order to free
the forklift, the forklift driver instructed the semitrailer driver to pull
away from the loading dock.59 When the truck pulled away, the
dockboard fell to its lowest position and the forklift tipped over, pinning Bilotta by his neck against the warehouse doorjamb.60 He was
trapped for several minutes, and as a result suffered severe and permanent brain damage.61
Bilotta's complaint alleged strict liability, breach of warranty, and
negligence.6 2 He contended that the absence of the panic stop safety
feature rendered the Kelley dockboard defective and unreasonably
dangerous.63 On the strict liability count, the case was submitted to
the jury under Minnesota PracticeJury Instruction Guide 1 118 (JIG
II1 118),64 an instruction containing the Restatement's consumer expectation standard. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Bilotta.65
On appeal, the defendant argued that the consumer expectation
standard did not adequately present its theory of the case because it
did not allow the jury to consider the reasonableness of their decision to market a mechanical dockboard without a panic stop. 66 This
58. Id. at 620.
59. Id. Michael McGrath, a third-party defendant, was the forklift driver who
gave this instruction. Id. Two dockworkers and two experts considered this instruction to be gross negligence and "astonishingly stupid." See Appellant's Brief at 4.
60. 346 N.W.2d at 620.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 618.
63. See Appellant's Brief at 5. The plaintiff also asserted a failure to warn theory
of recovery. The plaintiff argued that failing to warn users that the Kelley dockboard
could fall to its lowest level if a truck pulled away from it constituted negligence and
an additional reason to classify the dockboard as defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id.
64. 346 N.W.2d at 621. As submitted by the Bilotta trial court, Minnesota Jury
Instruction Guide 11 118 read:
A product is in a defective condition if, at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, it is in a condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary
user.
A condition is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous when used by
an ordinary user who uses it with the knowledge common to the community
as to the product's characteristics and common usage.
The defect may be in the design of the product itself or in the instructions necessary for its safe use.
Id.; see 4 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE
II 118, at 96-97 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as JIG 11 118].
65. 346 N.W.2d at 621. Kelley Company was found strictly liable and negligent.
Id. at 619. Safelite Industries, the lessee of the warehouse, and Pugleasa Company,
the distributor of the dockboard, were also found negligent. The court attributed
50% of the fault to Kelley Company, 40% to Safelite Industries, and 10% to
Pugleasa Company. Damages were assessed at $2,300,000. Id.
66. Id. at 621. Kelley Company introduced evidence of the high cost of the panic
stop option, which decreased marketability of the board. The board's quick and simple installation procedure would be impaired by the additional steps required for
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argument framed the major issue in Bilotta: whether the consumer
expectation standard provided adequate guidance for a jury assessing an alleged design defect.67
In deciding this issue, the Bilotta court first looked to its recent
decision in Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing,Inc. 68 Holm involved an ob-

vious or patent design defect.69 The Holm court abolished the latentpatent danger rule, which relieved a manufacturer from liability if the
dangers of this product were obvious to the user. 70 In its place the
court adopted a reasonable care balancing test, under which the jury
balances the likelihood and gravity of harm against the burden of
taking effective precautions to avoid the harm.7t Holm was signifiinstalling a panic stop. Kelley Company argued that the jury was, in effect, instructed
to disregard this evidence when instructed to consider only the expectations of the
consumer. Id.
67. Id. Other issues considered in Bilotta were:
(1) Whether the instructions were adequate when they failed to state that warnings are not required for obvious dangers. The court never directly resolved this
issue. Apparently, the instructions on failure to warn were accurate. The court
nonetheless ruled that there must be a new trial because it was impossible to tell
whether the jury based its decision on the erronous design defect instruction or failure to warn. Id. at 623.
(2) Whether the offer of an optional safety device, without which the product is
unreasonably dangerous, relieved the manufacturer from liability as a matter of law.
On this issue, the court ruled that a manufacturer's duty to produce a reasonably safe
product could not be passed on to the purchaser through the offer of an optional
safety device. See id. at 624.
(3) Whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on express warranties.
The court ruled that an instruction on express warranty is justified only if the trial
court finds that the evidence supports the giving of such an instruction and if a special interrogatory is submitted to the jury on that issue. Id. at 625.
(4) Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on superseding
cause. The court ruled in the negative because the third-party negligence of the forklift driver and the OSHA violations committed by both the forklift driver and other
Safelite employees were reasonably foreseeable. See id.
(5) Whether the expert testimony on causation was sufficient to support the verdict against Appellant Kelley Company. The court ruled in the affirmative. Id.
(6) Whether the jury verdict was irreconcilable. The court decided not to address this issue because on retrial, the negligence of all defendants would be reconsidered. Id.
68. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
69. Id. at 209. Holm was injured when his right arm struck a power line as he was
using an aerial ladder. He knew of the danger and was aware of the warnings on the
ladder and the truck. Id.
70. Id. at 213. The court reasoned that the latent-patent defect rule was contrary
to the policy behind strict products liability because it shifted the entire economic
loss to the injured party, even though the manufacturer was at fault to some degree.
The court also noted that the rule was contrary to Minnesota's comparative fault
statute. Id. (referring to MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1980)).
71. Id. at 212. The reasonable care risk/utility standard provides:
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or
design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely
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cant to the Bilotta decision because it implied that the consumer expectation standard should similarly be replaced with the reasonable
care balancing test. 72
The Bilotta court also noted that JIG II 118 was designed exclusively for use in manufacturing defect cases. 7 3 According to the
court, the condition of the product should be the focus in manufacturing defect cases. 7 4 The defect in the product is determined by
comparing the product to one of the manufacturer's flawless products. 75 In a design defect case, however, the defect "lies in a con-

sciously chosen design."76 The manufacturer's conduct, therefore,
must be examined in order to make the determination of product
defectiveness. The Bilotta court therefore replaced the consumer expectation standard in JIG II 118 with the reasonable care balancing
7
test of Holm. 7

to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the manner for
which the product was intended, as well as an unintended yet reasonably
foreseeable use.
What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the surrounding circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the likelihood of
harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm."
Id. (quoting Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78,
384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976)).
72. Both the latent-patent danger rule and the consumer expectation standard
bar recovery if the defect in the product is obvious. According to the consumer expectation standard, if the danger is within the contemplation of the ordinary consumer, the product is not unreasonably dangerous and recovery is denied. This
similarity between the Restatement's consumer expectation standard and the latentpatent defect rule has been recognized by courts and commentators. See, e.g.,
Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 130-32, 576 P.2d 725, 730-31
(1978); Birnbaum, supra note 10, at 613; Steenson, supra note 26, at 30-32. Since the
Holm decision abolished the latent-patent danger rule, the basis of the consumer expectation standard is questionable by implication.
73. 346 N.W.2d at 621-22.
74. Id. at 622.
75. Id.
76. Id. Product defectiveness cannot be determined in design defect cases by
comparing the manufacturer's allegedly defective product to a similar unflawed product because the product functions as intended. See Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 72223; Steenson, supra note 26, at 23.
77. 346 N.W.2d at 622. The court reconstructed JIG 11 118 by declaring that
"the jury must be instructed ... on the manufacturer's duty to produce a safe product. We therefore adopt as additional instructions, to be substituted for the consumer expectation standard, set out in paragraph 2 of JIG II 118, the [reasonable
care balancing test] from Micallef which we approved in Holm. " Id.
The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability. Id. at 625.
Shortly before the case was to be retried, Kelley Company and Bilotta entered into a
settlement agreement. Bilotta was awarded $486,942 in a lump sum and $347,000 in
a structured settlement. The only remaining issue on retrial was Bilotta's entitlement
to prejudgment interest. On retrial, using the first trial transcript and the same exhibits, the district court apportioned 55% of the fault to Kelley Company. The dis-
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This new instruction on the law of design defect78 appears to represent a merger of strict liability and negligence. 79 As evidence of
trict court then awarded Bilotta prejudgment interest from the time of the first
verdict. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that it was error
to award prejudgment interest for periods prior to the determination of liability. See
Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 358 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
A third edition of the Minnesota Jury Instruction Guide is currently in progress.
The tentative final draft of the jury instruction governing strict liability and design
defects incorporates Bilotta:
A product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user, consumer, or the user's or consumer's property, if the manufacturer
did not use reasonable care in the design of a product.
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in the design of a
product, so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who (property that) is likely to be exposed to harm when the product is put to its
intended use or to any use that is unintended but is reasonably foreseeable.
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that a reasonable prudent person
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
The reasonable care to be exercised by a manufacturer in the design of
a product will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including, among
others, a balancing of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness of that
harm against the feasibility and burden of any precautions which would be
effective to avoid the harm. In determining whether reasonable care was
exercised by the manufacturer you are instructed that the manufacturer is
obligated to keep informed of scientific knowledge and discoveries in its
field.
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care in designing the product in question, then the product is in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user, consumer, or the user's or consumer's property.
MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, INSTRUCTING THE CIVIL JURY WITH THE

NEW JIGs, JIG III 116, at 24-25 (1985) (to be republished in MINNESOTA PRACTICE,
INSTRUCTION GUIDE III 116 (3d ed. 1985 or 1986)).

JURY

78. 346 N.W.2d at 621.
79. Justice Simonett noted in his concurrence, "One could, I suppose, label this
instruction either a negligence or a strict liability instruction because it is something
of both." 346 N.W.2d at 626 (Simonett, J., concurring). Justice Simonett approved

of the modified JIG instruction for use in design defect cases because it "reconciles
the strict liability notion of 'defect' with the negligence concept of 'reasonable
care.' " Id. Justice Simonett, only partially satisfied with the notion of defect, would
shift the focus in a design defect case to unsafe design. Justice Simonett proposed his
own version of a jury instruction combining strict liability and negligence for unsafe
design cases:
A product is unsafely designed if, by reason of its design, the product is
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. The manufacturer has a duty to use due care to design a product that does not create an
unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is put to its intended use or to any unintended yet
reasonably foreseeable use.
The reasonable care to be exercised by a manufacturer in the design of
a product will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including, among

others, a balancing of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness of that
harm against the feasability [sic] and burden of any precautions which would
be effective to avoid the harm.
Id. at 626 n.2.
According toJustice Simonett, once the case is submitted to the jury, the distinc-
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this apparent merger, the court noted that, "assuming proper instruction to ensure the broadest theory of recovery, a trial court
could properly submit a design-defect

. . .

case to a jury on a single

theory of products liability."80
It appears that the Bilotta court had three interrelated objectives in
mind when it decided that design defect cases should be submitted
to the jury on a single theory of products liability. First, the court
sought to eliminate jury confusion and irreconcilable verdicts.81
Second, the court wanted to make certain that responsible manufacturers are not treated as insurers.82 Finally, the court attempted to
relieve plaintiffs in future design defect cases from the difficult burden of proving negligence.83 Nevertheless, the court failed to comtion between strict liability and negligence in design defect cases disappears. The
biggest task is not which theory of liability to use, but how to submit the case to the
jury. Id. at 626. Justice Simonett's instruction is designed to facilitate cases where
several liability questions are involved. In a case in which liability for failure to warn
and a design defect question are involved, the failure to warn issue would be submitted to the jury on a theory of negligence. Id. at 626 n. 1. The design defect issue
could potentially be submitted on either a strict liability theory or a negligence theory. See id. at 626.
To avoid inconsistent verdicts, Justice Simonett would use his proposed jury instruction along with a simple special verdict question such as, "Was the product unsafely designed?" Id. Using this special verdict question would avert jury confusion
and inconsistent verdicts because it is not labeled as either strict liability or negligence. Id. at 626-27.
80. 346 N.W.2d at 623. Submitting a products liability case to the jury on a single theory of recovery, whether it be negligence, strict liability, or a mixture of both,
has some support. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 5, at 36; cf. Steenson, supra note 26, at
46-47 (proposing jury instruction on a single theory of strict tort liability, but noting
problems with this approach).
81. 346 N.W.2d at 623. "Submission of a single theory of recovery may avoid
the confusion and inconsistent verdicts spawned by submission of multiple overlapping theories .... ." Id.
82. This objective is implicit in the court's opinion. Adopting a reasonable care
risk/utility standard in a conscious design defect case would enable a manufacturer to
introduce evidence of the reasonableness of its decision to accept the known risks
presented by its product. Thejury could therefore decide that in spite of the dangers
posed by the product, which may be beyond the contemplation of the ordinary consumer according to the consumer expectation standard, the utility of the product
outweighed the dangers. In a conscious design defect case, the manufacturer's conduct must be examined in this manner or insurer liability is inevitable. See generally
Product Liability, supra note 29, at 741 (discussing attempts "to define [the] elusive
element of wrongfulness in the design defect product").
83. Though this objective is not entirely clear from reading the majority opinion,
it is a reasonable conclusion in light of the fact that the court acknowledged a distinction between strict liability and negligence in design defect cases-the imputation of
scienter. Id. at 622: see infra note 88 and accompanying text. According to the Bilotta
majority, this distinction makes strict liability the broader theory of recovery because
it would, in theory, enable a plaintiff to recover in a design defect case without requiring proof of negligence. In this respect, the court specifically stated that they did not
want a single theory of products liability to restrict "a plaintiff's ability to benefit from
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pletely eliminate the need to prove negligence in conscious design
84
defect cases.
The instruction proposed by the majority 85 will eliminate most of
the jury confusion by providing better guidance. Since a single theory of products liability may be used in future design defect cases,
the jury will no longer arrive at a verdict finding the defendant negligent but not strictly liable. Additionally, the jury will be instructed
on a theory of negligence in conscious design defect cases and,
therefore, will no longer be put in the position of determining what
the ordinary consumer would contemplate when using a particular
product.86
the elements of proof which make strict liability a broader theory of recovery than
traditional negligence." Id. at 623 (footnote omitted) (citing Holm, 324 N.W.2d at
214 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In Holm, Justice
Simonett noted that trial courts tend to submit a design defect case to the jury on all
theories of recovery in order to avoid a reversal. Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 214 (Simonett,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This practice, however, results in inconsistent verdicts. See id. Justice Simonett argued that this problem could be solved
by using only a theory of negligence in design defect cases where "the claims of
'defect' are limited to assertions that the manufacturer should have added devices to
its product to warn and protect the user against the obvious danger .... ." Id. at
216. The Bilotta court did not go as far as Justice Simonett's Holm opinion, but may
have been influenced by a footnote in his opinion which advocated the use of a single
theory of product fault liability. Id. at 215 n.3; see Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623. By not
clearly distinguishing between a conscious design defect case and an inadvertent design error case, see generally supra note 20, the Bilotta majority incorrectly assumed that
they could eliminate the plaintiffs burden to prove negligence in all design defect
cases. A strict liability theory will only eliminate the need to prove negligence in a
design error case. See infra notes 91-93.
84. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
85. See 346 N.W.2d at 621-22. The new instruction will provide better guidance
than previous instructions used by Minnesota trial courts. In Halvorson, 307 Minn.
48, 240 N.W.2d 303, the trial court submitted a very long and confusing jury instruction which included everything from the consumer expectation standard to warranty
standards. See id. at 51-52, 240 N.W.2d at 305-06.
86. The new instruction is not without flaws. Critics of the reasonable care balancing test contend that it is too vague to be of any use to the jury. See O'Donnell &
Thomas, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem ofJuty Instructions Which Do Not
Instruct, 5 J. PROD. LIAB. 185, 194 (1982). The difficulties with using the consumer

expectation standard are well documented in Steenson, supra note 26, at 60-62.
The Bilotta court did not address these problems. The court simply agreed with
the appellant's theory that the jury must weigh the factors in the reasonable care
balancing test and decide whether the risk/utility balance struck by the manufacturer
was or was not reasonable. 346 NW.2d at 621-22. The court stated that the "fact
that installation or standardization of a safety device will cost more money and take
more time, thus decreasing sales, should be a factor considered within the balancing
approach given to the jury .... " Id. at 624. Aside from this fleeting reference, the
court did not attempt to give the reasonable care risk/utility test any content. See
supra note 29 (listing seven factors to be used in the risk/utility test).
It is important to note that the Bilotta court specifically stated that the jury, rather
than the court, is to weigh the factors in the risk/utility test. See 346 N.W.2d at 622.
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The fear of treating a manufacturer as an insurer of its product
underlies the rationale of the Bilotta decision. If the court held Kelley Company liable for Bilotta's injuries, Kelly Company would have
been forced to do one of two things: manufacture only its top of the
line dockboard with the panic stop and cross-traffic legs and be
driven out of the dockboard market, or continue to manufacture
dockboards without the panic stop and be treated as an insurer.
Neither of these alternatives is acceptable. The court therefore
abandoned the consumer expectation standard in favor of a negligence theory. This change in the substantive law effectively averts
the alternative of treating a manufacturer as an insurer by requiring
the jury to consider the reasonableness of a manufacturer's decision.
In an effort to ensure that plaintiffs in future design defect cases
would not be fettered with the difficulties of proving negligence, the
Bilotta court acknowledged a distinction between negligence and
strict liability.87 According to the majority, "the distinction between
strict liability and negligence in design-defect . . .cases is that in

strict liability, knowledge of the condition of the product and the
risks involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer,
whereas in negligence these elements must be proven." 8 8
Nevertheless, the new products liability instruction developed by
the court fails to preserve any distinction between strict liability and
negligence in conscious design defect cases. According to the new
instruction, the existence of a design defect depends on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.8 9 Focusing on the conduct of
the manufacturer, rather than on the product itself, is fundamentally
a negligence analysis.90
Justice Simonett contends that the risk/utility test should be used by the court to

determine, "as a matter of policy, to draw a line as to liability, whether that liability
be characterized as negligence or strict liability or both." Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 215

(Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted); see also
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025-26 (determination as to whether risk of loss should be
placed on supplier is a decision to be made by the court).
Most courts and commentators agree that juries are capable of performing the
risk/utility analysis, provided they are instructed properly. See, e.g., Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 43031, 573 P.2d at 454-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37; see also MODEL ACT,supra note 11,
§ 104, at 62,723; Henderson, supra note 10, at 799-800; O'Donnell & Thomas, supra,
at 215 (proposed jury instruction incorporating general utility/risk test).
87. 346 N.W.2d at 622.
88. Id. This imputation of knowledge in strict liability cases is known as imputed
scienter. For a discussion of imputed scienter, see supra notes 29, 83.
89. See 346 N.W.2d at 622 ("the reasonable care balancing test .. focuses on
the conduct of the manufacturer in evaluating . . . its choice of design").
90. See Henderson, supra note 10, at 777. But see O'Donnell & Thomas, supra note
10, at 281 (characterizing product versus conduct distinction as a cliche which has no
meaning). In Holm, Justice Simonett minimized the significance of the conduct-product distinction by asserting, "At the bottom of a strict liability theory is still the no-
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The imputation of knowledge of a product defect is unnecessary in
conscious design defect cases. 9 ' In those cases, manufacturers acknowledge that they knew of certain risks involved with the product
which lead to the plaintiff's injuries, but nevertheless decided that
the risks were outweighed by the utility or lower cost of the product
without the additional safety features.92 In inadvertant design error
cases, manufacturers are unaware of the scientific or technological
9 3 Imputdevelopments which would eliminate or reduce the risks.
ing knowledge of the condition of the product which led to the plain-

9
tiff's injuries therefore eases the plaintiff's burden of proof. 4

tion (certainly shared by jurors) that the manufacturer did something wrong and,
therefore, should pay." Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 215 (Simonett, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
91. See Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 722-25.
92. Id. at 722-23.
93. See Product Liability, supra note 29, at 751. Dean Wade also notes two additional types of knowledge about the product that the manufacturer may not possess
at the time of manufacture: "knowledge of the dangers, hazards, or risks of normal
use," and "knowledge involving the ways in which the product may be used or its
condition altered by users." See id. at 751-52.
94. The plaintiff's burden of proof in design error cases requires proving
"knowability." Dean Wade defines the term as "scientifically available knowledge."
Id. at 749. Dean Wade contends, "At a minimum, a 'knowable danger' in strict liability terms should satisfy the negligence requirement that a reasonably prudent person
should have anticipated it." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 comment a). If the plaintiff proves that a particular design change which would have
averted his or her injury was knowable at the time of manufacture, this knowledge
could be imputed to the defendant, thus easing the plaintiffs burden of proof.
The majority rule holds that a manufacturer will not be held to a state of knowledge not in existence at the time a product was manufactured. See Steenson, supra

note 26, at 27. But see Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F. Supp. 1317, 1320
(E.D. Tex. 1983) (manufacturer held strictly liable for injuries caused by defective
product although manufacturer, who was held to the knowledge and skill of an expert, could not have reasonably foreseen the danger at the time the product was
manufactured); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d
539, 546 (1982) (asbestos manufacturer held liable even though dangers of asbestos
were presumably unknown by the medical community at the time of manufacture);
Product Liability, supra note 29, at 757. Contra Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 189
N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (1983) (exception to the Beshada rule for unavoidably
unsafe drugs).
Imputing this knowledge would relieve the plaintiff from proving that the defendant knew or should have known of an alternative body of scientific and technical
knowledge which would have avoided the harm. Without this imputation, plaintiffs
may likely lose on a directed verdict due to their inability to establish a prima facie
negligence case. Professor Steenson capsulizes the advantage of a strict liability imputed scienter theory in this manner:
Whatever distinctive aspects strict liability has in the context of a design
defect case may well depend more on the admissibility of certain evidence to
prove the defect and on the court's view concerning the type of evidence
necessary to take a case to the jury, than on the standard ultimately utilized
by a jury to evaluate an allegedly defective product.
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Although the Bilotta court mentioned the phrase "conscious design
defect" in its opinion,95 it never clearly distinguished between a conscious design defect and an inadvertent design error.9 6 Since the
imputation of scienter is unnecessary in conscious design defect
cases, the Bilotta decision should be understood as ensuring the
plaintiff the broadest theory of recovery in inadvertant design error
cases only. 9 7 If the Bilotta court intended strict liability concepts to

apply to conscious design defect cases in order to ease the plaintiff's
burden of proof, it clearly failed in this objective.
Perhaps the best way to reconcile this anomoly developed by the
Bilotta majority is by examining Justice Simonett's concurring opinion.9 8 Justice Simonett contended that neither negligence nor strict
liability is broader than the other.9 9 Rather, in terms of making a
prima facie case or avoiding a directed verdict, one theory may be
better than the other depending on the facts of the particular case.10 0
If the facts of the case involve design errors, a theory of strict liability
should be applied to afford the plaintiff the broadest or better theory
of recovery.' 0 ' In a conscious design defect case, however, the imputation of scienter is useless.102 The plaintiff is left with either the
consumer expectation standard or having to prove negligence. Since
the consumer expectation standard is unacceptable in conscious design defect cases,' 0 3 negligence is the only theory available to the
plaintiff. Negligence should therefore be used in conscious design
defect cases and strict liability theories in design error and manufacturing defect cases.
The use of a negligence theory in conscious design defect cases
will meet the same policy objectives underlying the theory of strict
products liability. There are essentially three policy justifications
which support the theory of strict products liability: enterprise liability or risk spreading; accident prevention through deterrence; and
Steenson, supra note 26, at 25.
For a discussion of the distinction between a design error case and a conscious
design defect case, see supra note 20.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See 346 N.W.2d at 620.
See id. at 622.
See id. at 623; supra note 94.
346 N.W.2d at 625-27 (Simonett, J., concurring).
Id.

100. See id. at 626 ("the distinctions between strict liability and negligence may be
important to the trial court in deciding whether the case goes to the jury, but once
the case is submitted . . . any distinction between strict liability and negligence is

nonexistent where the claim is for design defect").

101. It is in design error and manufacturing defect cases that the imputed scienter
theory of strict liability provides the most benefits. See Walkowiak, supra note 55, at

720.
102. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 27.
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easing the plaintiff's burden of proof.10 4
In conscious design defect cases, applying a negligence standard
fulfills the policy of placing the burden of loss on the best risk distributor.10 5 The proof requirements in strict liability and negligence
actions merge in conscious design defect cases.' 0 6 Since the imputation of knowledge of the product defect is unnecessary in conscious
design defect cases, the results will be the same under either theory
0
of liability. ' 7
A negligence standard, focusing on conduct rather than the product, provides a more efficient level of deterrence than a product-oriented strict liability standard. Only conduct can be deterred.108 A
strict liability analysis which focuses exclusively on the product
through the consumer expectation standard fosters uncertainty. As a
result, either all risk-taking conduct will be deterred regardless of
whether the product contains more benefits than risks,109 or manufacturers will continue to manufacture their products in spite of the
uncertainty. In the latter case, the result is higher products liability
104. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 99, at 692-93.
105. See Comment, supra note 10, at 580-81. One commentator argues that the
theory of risk spreading seems to be "more incantation than analysis" and is therefore a questionable strict liability rationale. O'Donnell & Thomas, supra note 10, at
286.
106. See Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(strict liability theory incorporating risk/utility balancing formula in conscious design
defect case); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir.
1974) (negligence theory incorporating risk/utility balancing formula in conscious
design defect case); Strict Tort Liability, supra note 22, at 836. "In the case of the
improper design . . . whatever is enough to show that it is so dangerous that strict
liability should apply. . . will also be enough to show negligence on the part of the
manufacturer." Id.
Both negligence and strict liability theories utilize the risk/utility balancing test.
Id. The strict liability theory, however, attempts to reduce the plaintiff's burden of
proof by imputing knowledge of the product defect to the manufacturer. See Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041 (1974).
107. See Steenson, supra note 26, at 27.
108. Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 745. The conduct sought to be deterred in a
conscious design defect case is conduct which results in the production of a product
posing more risks to society than benefits. If this conduct is deterred, then theoretically there will be fewer product-related injuries. Professor Walkowiak regards this
goal as "the foremost goal of any system of loss shifting based upon an artificially
created standard." Id. at 737. Nevertheless, the law should not deter conduct resulting in the production of products which embrace more benefits than risks.
109. This happens because the manufacturer cannot predict whether a jury will
decide that the product design hazards, which the product was not designed to protect against, are beyond the contemplation of the ordinary consumer. Thus, in order
to be safe, the manufacturer designs a product which contains more safety features
than necessary. This result is undesirable because the product price is likely to be
increased to an exorbitant amount or the product's utility will be significantly reduced. See Davison, supra note 29, at 645.
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insurance rates" 0 and product prices which do not reflect the products' risks.IIl Through the use of a negligence theory, a manufacturer will be better apprised of the standards by which its conduct,
2
and consequently its product, will be judged."l
The policy of easing plaintiff's burden of proof cannot be equitably fulfilled in a conscious design defect case. Most, if not all, conscious design choices result in the production of products which
contain some risks. A manufacturer is not obligated to produce only
risk free products.'i1 If the manufacturer's conduct is not considered, the manufacturer will be held liable every time someone is injured by its product. This is not the intent of products liability
law.i14 Since an examination of the manufacturer's conduct is necessary in a conscious design defect case in order to achieve an equitable result, the policy of easing the plaintiff's burden of proof will
never be met in conscious design defect cases.
Nevertheless, the policy of easing the plaintiff's burden of proof
can be met in design error cases. The Bilotta decision should not be
interpreted as requiring the plaintiff to prove negligence in design
error cases. Plaintiffs encounter more difficulty proving negligence
in design error cases than in conscious design defect cases. In the
former category, plaintiffs must meet the difficult burden of establishing foreseeability. Imputation of scienter or knowledge of the
risks involved with the product, in effect, establishes foreseeability as
a matter of law.'15 In the conscious design defect cases, however, it
110. See Birnbaum, supra note 10, at 644; Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 737-44. It is
precisely for this reason that the Uniform Products Liability Act explicitly rejected a
strict liability theory in design defect cases and adopted a negligence theory very
similar to the Bilotta reasonable care standard. See MODEL ACT, supra note 11, Introduction, at 62,714; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 585. In submitting a defective design
case to a jury, the Model Act takes the following position:
(1) In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in
design, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms,
and the seriousness of those harms outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented those harms, and the
adverse effect that an alternative design would have on the usefulness of the
product.
MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 104, at 62,721.
111. See Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 741 (strict liability insurance distributes costs
of compensating for injuries to producers of lower risk products, forcing prices of
those products higher).
112. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 10 at 634-36, 648.
113. See Davison, supra note 29, at 645-59.
114. See id. at 645-46.
115. See O'Donnell & Thomas, supra note 86, at 202-03. Most authorities who
distinguish between conscious design defects and design errors agree that scienter
should be imputed in design error cases, since the design error case is very similar to
the manufacturing defect case where imputation of scienter works well. In both
cases, had the manufacturer known about the risks that the product presented to the
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is not as difficult to prove negligence because the manufacturers admit that they knew of the precise risks which lead to the plaintiffs'
injuries, but consciously decided not to design the product to protect
against those risks.
The Bilotta decision eliminates much of the confusion in Minnesota
design defect law. Irreconcilable jury verdicts will occur less frequently and the jury, at least in conscious design defect cases, will no
longer be confused by the consumer expectation standard. The Bilotta decision significantly changes Minnesota products liability law
and should be understood as a policy decision which attempts to balance the equities between the injured plaintiff and the responsible
manufacturer. By sanctioning the use of a single theory of products
liability incorporating the broadest aspects of both negligence and
strict liability theories, the injured plaintiff will be afforded the best
possible theory of recovery. If the facts of the case present design
errors, traditional strict liability theories should apply. In a conscious design defect case, a negligence theory should be used. This
necessary distinction, implied in the Bilotta decision, balances the equities between parties involved in design defect cases.
public, they probably would not have marketed it in its defective condition. Since it is
difficult to prove negligence in both of these kinds of cases, it is equitable to ease the
plaintiff's burden of proof to some degree. See, e.g., Walkowiak, supra note 55, at 720.
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